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Available online 22 March 2016Background: Live poultrymarkets (LPMs) pose a threat to public health by promoting the ampliﬁcation and dissem-
ination of avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) and by providing the ideal setting for zoonotic inﬂuenza transmission.
Objective: This review assessed the impact of different interventions implemented in LPMs to control the emergence
of zoonotic inﬂuenza.
Methods: Publications were identiﬁed through a systematic literature search in the PubMed, MEDLINE andWeb of
Science databases. Eligible studies assessed the impact of different interventions, such as temporary market closure
or a ban on holding poultry overnight, in reducing i) AIV-detection rates in birds and themarket environment or ii)
inﬂuenza incidence in humans. Unpublished literature, reviews, editorials, cross-sectional studies, theoretical
models and publications in languages other than English were excluded. Relevant ﬁndings were extracted and crit-
ically evaluated. For the comparative analysis of ﬁndings across studies, standardized outcomemeasureswere com-
puted as i) the relative risk reduction (RRR) of AIV-detection in LPMs and ii) incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of H7N9-
incidence in humans.
Results: A total of 16 publications were identiﬁed and reviewed. Collectively, the data suggest that AIV-circulation
can be signiﬁcantly reduced in the LPM-environment and amongmarket-birds through (i) temporary LPM closure,
(ii) periodic rest days (iii) market depopulation overnight and (iv) improved hygiene and disinfection. Overall, the
ﬁndings indicate that the length of stay of poultry in the market is a critical control point to interrupt the AIV-rep-
lication cycle within LPMs. In addition, temporary LPM closurewas associatedwith a signiﬁcant reduction of the in-
cidence of zoonotic inﬂuenza. The interpretation of these ﬁndings is limited by variations in the implementation of
interventions. In addition, some of the included studies were of ecologic nature or lacked an inferential framework,
which might have lead to cosiderable confounding and bias.
Conclusions: The evidence collected in this review endorses permanent LPM-closure as a long-term objective to re-
duce the zoonotic risk of avian inﬂuenza, although its economic and socio-political implications favour less drastic
interventions, e.g. weekly rest days, for implementation in the short-term.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Human inﬂuenza viruses cause seasonal inﬂuenza, a globally wide-
spread respiratory illness giving rise to ~3–5 million cases of severe ill-
ness every year [1]. Inﬂuenza viruses can also be found in other
mammals and birds, and the greatest diversity of inﬂuenza viruses oc-
curs in aquatic birds [2]. Most strains of avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs)
do not pose a risk to human health. Some strains however, e.g. subtypes
H7N9 [3] and H5N1 [4], have acquired the ability to cross the species-
barrier and infect humans who come into close contact with infected
birds or contaminated environments [5]. Occasionally, animal inﬂuenza
viruses cause global pandemics in humans, as happened three times in
the 20th century and most recently in 2009 [6,7]. Surveillance of avian
inﬂuenza viruses is important to identify new strains that may pose a
pandemic threat [8].
Because of the high density and variety of avian hosts, live poultry
markets (LPMs) support themaintenance, ampliﬁcation and dissemina-
tion of AIVs [8–11]. In addition, LPMs provide frequent opportunities for
inter-species transmission events [8–12]. In fact, the emergence of zoo-
notic inﬂuenza outbreaks has often been preceded by long-lasting AIV-
circulation in market poultry [13,14].
Considering the unpredictability of the subtype or strain causing the
next zoonotic or pandemic inﬂuenza threat [15], generic measures to
control the endemicity of AIVs at the source, e.g. in market poultry, re-
main key elements of pandemic preparedness [8,15,16]. Permanent
LPM closure encounters strong public resistance [17]. Nonetheless, Chi-
nese LPMs were temporarily closed during both H7N9-waves [18].
Hong Kong's LPMs implemented monthly [19] or bimonthly [20] rest
days and an overnight poultry storage ban [21]. Similarly, LPM-
systems in the North-Eastern USA have introduced regular depopula-
tion and disinfection of all markets in 2002 [22–24].
This review discusses the impact of different LPM interventions on
(i) AIV-circulation in LPMs and (ii) AIV-transmission to humans, draw-
ing implications for policy recommendations based on the collective sci-
entiﬁc evidence.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Literature search
The databases PubMed,Web of Science andMEDLINEwere searched
for relevant articles through the following search string: ((poultry mar-
ket) OR (poultry markets)) AND (avian inﬂuenza). This search was
complemented with different combinations of the following search
terms: “live poultry market/markets”, “avian inﬂuenza”, “overnight”,
“rest day”, “market closure”, “clos*” and “ban”. The literature search
was conducted on 25 July 2015.2.2. Inclusion criteria
Settings: live poultry markets worldwide; no time restrictions;
Interventions: temporary LPM closure, periodic rest days combined
with depopulation and disinfection of the markets, sale ban of speciﬁc
bird species and ban on holding live poultry within LPMs overnight;
Outcomes: AIV-detection rates in birds and/or the market environ-
ment or inﬂuenza incidence in humans;
Study design: before–after studies assessing the impact of either of
the listed interventions on either of the outcomes.
2.3. Exclusion criteria
Unpublished literature, reviews, editorials, cross-sectional studies,
theoretical models and publications in languages other than English
were excluded.
2.4. Data extraction
All studieswere individually assessedwith regard to study design and
potential bias or confounding. No study was excluded based on these
criteria, but major limitations of speciﬁc studies are discussed in the text.
The following information was retrieved from the included studies:
location, inﬂuenza strain, type and date of intervention, data collection
methods, main outcomes and ﬁndings. Because of the differences in
study design, data analysis and reporting methods, the computation of
a pooled estimate of intervention effectiveness was not possible within
this group of studies. To compare ﬁndings across studies, standardized
outcome measures were computed as i) relative risk reduction (RRR)
of AIV-detection in LPMs and ii) incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of H7N9-
incidence in humans. When necessary, raw data was retrieved from
supplementary materials.
2.5. Calculation of epidemiologic outcome measures
The following outcome measures were used to summarize the
ﬁndings:
Average AIV-prevalence before (Ppre) or after (Ppost) the intervention:
• Ppre = total nr. of positive samples before the intervention/total nr. of
samples tested before the intervention
• Ppost= total nr. of positive samples after the intervention/total nr. of sam-
ples tested after the intervention
Relative risk (RR):
RR ¼ Ppost=Ppre
Fig. 1. Visual summary of the literature search and inclusion process.
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outcome:
RRR ¼ 1−RR
The 95% conﬁdence intervals for the RRRwere calculated as 1 minus
the conﬁdence limits of the relative risk.
Incidence rate ratio (IRR) for studies with H7N9-incidence as an
outcome:
IRR = incidence rate after the intervention / incidence rate before
the intervention
LPM closure effectiveness was calculated as oneminus the incidence
rate ratio.
The statistical analysis was conducted with SPSS statistical software,
version 20.3. Results
3.1. Overview of the included studies
The combination of search terms in the three databases delivered
a total of 1282 articles, in addition to six publications identiﬁed from
reference lists (Fig. 1). Ultimately, this review included 16 studies
assessing the before–after impact of different interventions in LPMs
on the reduction of (i) AIV-detection rates by virus isolation or RT-
PCR in the markets (n = 7) or (ii) inﬂuenza incidence in humans
(n = 9) (Fig. 1). A detailed description of all included studies is pro-
vided in supplementary Tables S1 and S2.3.2. Impact of LPM interventions on AIV-isolation rates in Hong Kong
Three studies assessed the effectiveness of different LPM inter-
ventions in reducing AIV-isolation rates in Hong Kong's LPMs,
using the endemic poultry strain H9N2 as indicator for virus
survival [19–21]. Kung and colleagues determined the impact of a
mandatory rest day combined with depopulation and restocking,
introduced in Hong Kong in 2001 [19]. A total of 2218 faecal swabs
were sampled from different bird species within a 6-day window
prior and after the monthly intervention. The study reported odds
ratios (ORs) of H9N2-isolation before and after the rest day [19].
Each month, the risk of H9N2-isolation was signiﬁcantly reduced by
87–100% after the intervention (p-values ≤ 0.01) [19]. However, isola-
tion rates reached again pre-intervention values within a month [19].
Subsequently, Lau and colleagues utilized faecal bird-samples
routinely collected in Hong Kong LPMs between 1999 and 2005 to
assess the additive effectiveness of a live quail sale ban and an addi-
tional monthly rest day [20]. A multivariable Poisson General Linear
Model (GLM) adjusted for several potential confounders of AIV-
transmission was used to calculate relative risks (RRs) of weekly
H9N2-isolation during the different intervention periods, com-
pared to the time period prior to the implementation of the ﬁrst
rest day [20]. According to this model, the introduction of one
monthly rest day resulted in a 27% (p-value = 0.22) or 58% (p-
value = 0.001) reduction in H9N2 average isolation rates in
chickens and minor poultry, respectively [20]. After the quail sale
ban and the second monthly rest day, average isolation rates
from both chickens (RR = 0.56; p-value = 0.09) and minor poultry
(RR = 0.37; p-value = 0.01) declined further, although these
interventions did not affect the circulation of H9N2 signiﬁcantly
[20].
Table 1
Relative risk reduction (RRR) of AIV-detection in studies assessing the immediate effects of interventions. (Sample collection within a b3 week time window.)
Study Inﬂuenza
strain
Intervention Sampling period and AIV detection method Pprea Ppostb RRR (95%
CI)
Kung et al. (2003) H9N2 Monthly rest day, depopulation and C/D Monthly, within a 6-day window before & after
rest day (virus isolation)
5.0%
(56/1122)
0.4%
(4/1096)
0.93
(0.80; 0.97)⁎
Kang et al. (2015) H7N9 Two-week LPM closure and C/D One week before closure and at re-opening
(RT-PCR)
14.8%
(112/755)
1.7%
(5/300)
0.89
(0.73; 0.95)⁎
Trock et al. (2008) H7N2,
H5N2
LPM depopulation and C/D 1–17 days before the intervention and upon visual
C/D approval (virus isolation)
22.5%
(306/1362)
0.4%
(1/226)
0.98
(0.86; 1.00)⁎
1–17 days before the intervention and 0–3 days
after C/D approval (virus isolation)
22.5%
(306/1362)
4.6%
(46/996)
0.79
(0.72; 0.85)⁎
C/D = cleaning and disinfection.
a Ppre = prevalence before the intervention.
b Ppost = prevalence after the intervention.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at the α= 0.05 level.
58 V. Offeddu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 55–64A follow-up study revealed that a ban on overnight storage of live
poultry introduced in 2008 dramatically reduced H9N2-isolation rates
by an additional 84% and 100% in chickens and minor poultry, respec-
tively (p-values b 0.05) [21].3.3. Impact of LPM closures in Mainland China
Following the emergence of H7N9 in early 2013 [25], a weekly 24-h
LPM closurewas introduced in Guangzhou [26]. Samples were collected
during the time period spanning one month before and two months
after LPM closure and the prevalence of different AIV strains was
assessed by RT-PCR. After the intervention, overall AIV-prevalence was
signiﬁcantly decreased in environmental (χ2 = 6.25; p-value =
0.012), but not animal specimens [26].
In a similar study in Guangdong, 15% (112/755) of samples were
H7N9-positive by RT-PCR one week before a 14 day LPM closure period
[27], but this proportion was signiﬁcantly reduced to 1.67% (5/300) at
market re-opening (χ2 = 37.75; p-value b 0.01) [27].Table 2
Relative risk reduction (RRR) of AIV-detection in studies assessing the long-term effects of inte
Study Inﬂuenza
strain
Intervention Sampling period and
detection method
Yuan et al.
(2014b)
H7N9, H5, H9 Weekly rest day, depopulation and C/D During the 33 days b
3–56 days after the
implementation of t
rest day (RT-PCR)
Lau et al.
(2007)
H9N2 +Monthly rest day, depopulation, C/D ~Daily over a total t
N6 years, during the
before or after the a
implementation of e
intervention (chicke
only) (virus isolatio
+Ban of live quail sales
+Additional monthly rest day
All interventions (baseline: no
intervention)
Leung et al.
(2012)
H9N2 +Monthly rest day, depopulation, C/D ~weekly or monthly
of ~11.5 years, durin
periods before or aft
additive implement
intervention (chicke
only) (virus isolatio
+Ban of live quail sales
+Additional monthly rest day
+Ban on poultry overnight storage
All interventions (baseline: no
intervention)
C/D = cleaning and disinfection; Env = environmental samples; rLPM= retail LPM; wLPM=
a Ppre = prevalence before the intervention.
b Ppost = prevalence after the intervention.
⁎ signiﬁcant at the α= 0.05 level.3.4. Impact of quarterly LPM depopulation in the USA
In 2002, poultry traders from the New York City area agreed on the
quarterly depopulation and disinfection of all live bird markets (LBMs)
[23]. Before a depopulation event, H7N2 or H5N2 subtypes could be de-
tected in 22.5% of samples collected in LBMs. The proportion of AIV-
positive specimens decreased to 0.4% upon completed disinfection but
rose again to ~4.6% within three days [23].
A follow-up study covering a period of 6 years reported a steady de-
cline in the number of H7 and H5 isolations in this LBM system follow-
ing the implementation of the quarterly depopulation operations,
although additional interventions, e.g. all-year round vehicle washing,
likely played an important role as well [24].
3.5. Relative risk reduction of AIV isolations through LPM interventions
The relative risk reduction (RRR) of AIV-detection could be calculat-
ed from the rawdata provided in the papers or the technical appendices
of 6/7 publications.rventions. (Sample collection over time periods of N3 weeks.)
AIV Pprea Ppostb RRR (95% CI)
efore and the
he weekly
rLPMs
Total: 5.1%
(85/1660)
Total: 4.1%
(92/2224)
0.19 (−0.08; 0.39)
Env: 7.0% (70/1007) Env: 4.6% (64/1397) 0.34 (0.08; 0.53)⁎
Bird: 2.3% (15/653) Bird: 3.4% (28/827) −0.47 (−1.74; 0.21)
wLPMs
Total: 3.0% (7/230) Total: 2.1% (10/484) 0.32 (−0.76; 0.74)
Env: 3.4% (4/117) Env: 2.4% (5/209) 0.30 (−1.56; 0.81)
Bird: 2.7% (3/113) Bird: 1.8% (5/275) 0.32 (−1.82; 0.83)
ime period of
time periods
dditive
ach
n samples
n)
5.7% (360/6270) 5.8% (206/3542) −0.01 (−0.20; 0.14)
5.8% (206/3542) 3.2% (152/4768) 0.45 (0.33; 0.55)⁎
3.2% (152/4768) 2.0% (261/13,035) 0.37 (0.24; 0.48)⁎
5.7% (360/6270) 2.0% (261/13,035) 0.65 (0.59; 0.70)⁎
over a period
g the time
er the
ation of each
n samples
n)
5.9% (345/5816) 5.7% (246/4334) 0.04 (−0.12; 0.18)
5.7% (246/4334) 2.6% (110/4297) 0.55 (0.44; 0.64) *
2.6% (110/4297) 2.6% (633/24,286) −0.02 (−0.24; 0.17)
2.6% (633/24,286) 0.2% (11/4826) 0.91 (0.84; 0.95) *
5.9% (345/5816) 0.2% (11/4826) 0.96 (0.93; 0.98) *
wholesale LPM.
Table 3
Impact of LPM closure on the risk of H7N9-infection in humans.
Study Intervention Data source Reported outcome Location Date of
implementation
LPM closure
effectivenessa
Chowell
et al.
(2013)
LPM closure and bird
culling
Ofﬁcial notiﬁcations of
laboratory-conﬁrmed H7N9-cases
reported to CDC through national
surveillance system between March
1st and May 20th, 2013 (n = 73)
Observed daily H7N9-incidence
rate after LPM closure compared
to incidence rate estimated
according to an exponential
model ﬁtted to the daily case time
series prior to the intervention
Shanghai and
Zhejiang
provinces
April 6th, and
16th, 2013,
respectively
Not reportedb
Yu et al.
(2014)
Closure of 780 LPMs,
depopulation and
disinfection
Illness onset data of
laboratory-conﬁrmed and
hospitalized H7N9-cases announced
by China CDC until June 7th, 2013
(n = 60)
Reduction in mean daily number
of infections associated with
complete LPM closure (95% CrI)
Shanghai April 6th, 2013 99% (93%–100%)
Nanjing April 8th, 2013 97% (81%–100%)
Hangzhou April 15th/24th,
2013
99% (92%–100%)
Huzhou April 11th–21st,
2013
97% (68%–100%)
Lau et al.
(2014)
LPM closure Ofﬁcially announced
laboratory-conﬁrmed H7N9-cases
from Chinese CDC and from three
other line lists constructed with
publicly available information,
compiled based on reports of
laboratory-conﬁrmed H7N9-cases
between April 10th and May 31st,
2013
LPM closure effectiveness
calculated as 1 minus the ratio of
H7N9-incidence after LPM
closures versus incidence since
ﬁrst case (p-values from
likelihood ratio tests)
Shanghai April 6th, 2013 China CDC: 94%
(b0.001)
HealthMap: 93%
(b0.001)
Virginia Tech: 96%
(b0.001)
Flu Trackers: 94%
(b0.001)
Nanjing April 8th, 2013 China CDC: 99%
(0.007)
HealthMap: 100%
(0.034)
Virginia Tech: 98%
(0.010)
Flu Trackers: 64%
(0.328)
Hangzhou April 15th, 2013 China CDC: 100%
(b0.001)
HealthMap: 99%
(b0.001)
Virginia Tech: 99%
(b0.001)
Flu Trackers: 100%
(b0.001)
Wu et al.
(2014)
LPM closure for ≥7
consecutive days
Conﬁrmed H7N9-cases between 14
days before LPM closure or onset date
of ﬁrst conﬁrmed local case in 2014
(whichever later) and last day of LPM
closure or March 7th, 2014
(whichever earlier); data source not
reported (n = 69)
LPM closure effectiveness (95%
CI), calculated as 1 minus IRR
Guangdong and
Zhejiang
provinces
Different closing
dates in each
market between
January and
early March
2014
97% (87%–100%)
Kucharski
et al.
(2015)
LPM closure Symptom onset data; data source not
reported
Reduction of market spillover
hazard, i.e. the risk of
animal-to-human infection (95%
CrI)
Shanghai
province
First wave (2013):
99% (95%–100%)
Zhejiang
province
January
22nd–26th, 2014
First wave (2013):
99% (97%–100%)
Second wave
(2014): 97%
(92%–99%)
Jiangsu province First wave (2013):
97% (80%–100%)
Guangdong
province
Guangdong:
Guangzhou:
February
16th–28th 2014;
other cities: 2
week closure in
the same period
Second wave
(2014): 73%
(53%–89%)
LPM= live poultry market.
CDC = Center for disease control and prevention.
95% CrI = 95% Credibility interval.
95% CI = 95% Conﬁdence interval.
a LPM closure effectiveness expressed as 1-IRR; IRR = ratio of H7N9-incidence rate after LPM closure/H7N9-incidence rate before LPM closure.
b Quantitative estimate not provided; authors reported a signiﬁcant deceleration after LPM closure, outside of the conﬁdence bounds predicted by the pre-intervention model.
59V. Offeddu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 55–64According to studies collecting samples during the immediate
time period before and after the intervention (Table 1), the immedi-
ate risk of AIV-detection was always signiﬁcantly reduced after LPM
closure and disinfection, with RRRs ranging between 0.79 and 0.98
(p-values b 0.0001) [19,23,27].In contrast, long-term risk reduction following the implementation
of a regular LPM rest day was less evident (Table 2) [20,21,26]. For in-
stance, weekly rest days in Guangzhou's retail LPMs (rLPM) induced a
signiﬁcant risk reduction of AIV-detection from environmental speci-
mens (RRR = 0.34; 95% CI = 0.08–0.53), but not from animal samples
60 V. Offeddu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 55–64[26]. Similarly, the introduction of a monthly rest day in Hong Kong's
markets did not elicit a signiﬁcant sustained risk reduction of H9N2-
isolation between interventions [20] and the long-term impact of the bi-
monthly rest day (RRR=0.37; 95% CI=0.24–0.48) [20]was not entire-
ly consistent across studies [21]. Over the years, only the overnight
poultry storage ban elicited a sustained and highly signiﬁcant risk re-
duction of H9N2-isolation (RRR = 0.96; 95% CI = 0.93–0.98) [21].3.6. Impact of LPM closure on the risk of H7N9 infections in humans
Between April 2013 and early 2014, nine studies were conducted in
mainland China to investigate a potential association of LPM closure
with reduced H7N9-incidence in humans.
For instance, Chowell and colleagues developed a Bayesian expo-
nential model with intrinsic growth rate ﬁtted to daily case time series
reported in the Shanghai and Zhejiang provinces prior to the interven-
tion (Table 3) [28]. Compared to the expected number of H7N9-cases
predicted by the statistical model, H7N9-incidence rates were signiﬁ-
cantly reduced in the post-intervention period [28].
In the same time frame, Yu and colleagues quantiﬁed the impact of
closure and depopulation of 780 LPMs in four cities in Eastern China
[29]. Their model was based on the assumption of constant but different
pre- and post-intervention infection forces, which were estimated ac-
cording to the illness onset time series of hospitalized H7N9-cases in
each city. The model matched the observed incidence patterns with a
posterior predictive value of 0.9 [29]. This analysis revealed a dramatic
decline inH7N9-incidence in humanswithin 2–3 days from LPMclosure,
with very few case-onsets after the intervention (Table 3) [29]. Thisﬁnd-
ingwas consistentwith a 97%–99% risk reduction of human infection fol-
lowing LPM-closure. A similar analysis using several different sources of
epidemiologic data conﬁrmed a N90% reduction in H7N9-incidence fol-
lowing LPM closure in three of the four cities (p-values b 0.05)
(Table 3) [30]. According to a follow-up study, the effectiveness of LPM
closure in the subsequent winter was 97% (95% CI = 89%–100%) [31].
Kucharski and colleagues inferred market spill-over hazard re-
duction following LPM closure during both H7N9-waves in different
Chinese cities [32]. This study used H7N9-symptom-onset data to
construct a statistical model of infections, which assumed that (i) the
reported cases occurred following animal exposures and human-to-
human transmission, (ii) the incubation period distribution of infec-
tions acquired from animal exposures had zero variability, and (iii) sec-
ondary cases arising fromhuman-to-human transmissionwould have a
serial interval of 7 days. Inmost instances, LPM closures signiﬁcantly re-
duced spill-over hazard by N97% (95% CrIs: 80%–100%) (Table 3) [32].
Fourmore studies reported a qualitative impact of LPM closure on
the reduction of H7N9-transmission to humans (Table 4) [18,33–35].
For instance, Murhekar and colleagues reported a decline in the
number of human H7N9-cases in the Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu
provinces after all rLPMs and sale spots were closed [33]. Similarly,
two contemporaneous studies reported the decline in H7N9-
incidence in Huzhou [34] and Shanghai [18]. Except for one isolated
patient, no additional H7N9-case was detected in Huzhou following
the sequential closure of 139 LPMs (p-value = 0.01) [34]. In
Shanghai, the temporary closure and disinfection of 464 LPMs was
combined with a poultry import ban [18]. According to He and col-
leagues, four H7N9-cases were reported during the ﬁrst post-
intervention incubation period, but no additional cases followed
[18]. As soon as the banwas lifted in January 2014, 8 new caseswere re-
ported within a month. LPM-closure was re-implemented and H7N9-
incidence declined again to zero [18].
Accordingly, the proportion of H7N9-positive cases among cases re-
ported through the national Pneumonia of Unknown Etiology (PUE)
Surveillance system from different provinces decreased from 21% one
week before LPM closure to 4% or 2% during the ﬁrst or second week
post-intervention, respectively (p-value b0.001) [35].4. Discussion
4.1. Impact of LPM interventions on AIV isolation rates
Kung and colleagues demonstrated the signiﬁcant impact of a mar-
ket rest day in reducing virus isolation rates in LPMs. This study clearly
indicated that the viral load in the market is a result of virus ampliﬁca-
tion within the LPM, rather than a simple reﬂection of virus infection
within incoming poultry [19]. The overall virus isolation rates drifted
back to baseline prior to the next rest day, suggesting that the monthly
interventionmight reduce isolation rates only for a short period of time,
as conﬁrmed by later studies [20,21].
The two follow-up investigations from Hong Kong provide data
on the long-term impact of LPM interventions, accounting for several
confounding factors potentially inﬂuencing viral infection in poultry
[20,21]. These two studies convincingly demonstrated that both fre-
quent rest days [20,21] and a ban on holding live poultry overnight
[21] were effective in reducing H9N2-transmission within the LPM.
The overnight ban is particularly effective, because it limits the
length of stay of the birds in the markets, removing susceptible or
newly infected birds from the LPM before they become infectious
themselves. This identiﬁes the birds' length of stay and the AIV-
incubation period between infection and onset of transmission as
critical control points of AIV-circulation, as also postulated by math-
ematical models [36].
In concordance with the ﬁndings from Hong Kong, studies from
mainland China [26,27] and the USA [23,24] conﬁrmed LPMs as a
favourable environment for AIV-circulation in poultry and validated
market rest days [23,24,26] or prolonged LPM closure [27] as valuable
interventions to reduce environment-to-human transmission. The
long-term elimination of H7-strains from the American LBM-system
demonstrates that eradication of AIVs from market environments is
possible through regular interruptions of the constant bird ﬂow and dis-
infection, although the role of additional measures, e.g. all-year-round
vehicle washing, was also evident [23,24].
Despite the immediate risk reduction of AIV-isolation following LPM
closure and depopulation, a long-term beneﬁt was not always apparent.
For instance, AIV-transmission within bird populations in Chinese mar-
kets was not particularly sensitive to regular LPM-depopulation in the
long-run [26]. Accordingly, even though the monthly rest day in Hong
Kong had an immediate impact on H9N2-circulation [19], it did not sig-
niﬁcantly reduce average isolation rates over longer time periods [20,
21]. Over the years, the live quail sale ban induced a comparatively
much more dramatic risk reduction of AIV-isolation compared to one
or even two monthly rest days, although the ban of keeping poultry
overnight led to the most sustained impact [21]. The impact of the ban
on the sale of live quails was context-dependent, as it was introduced
based on previous research demonstrating that quails were the species
with the highest virus shedding rates within Hong Kong LPMs at the
time of the investigations.
It is important to note that the long-term effectiveness of such inter-
ventions is highly dependent of AIV-prevalence among incoming poul-
try. The studies inHongKongwere of necessity carried outwith subtype
H9N2, which is more endemic in incoming poultry than, for example,
the more clinically relevant H5N1. When virus prevalence is very high
in incoming birds, viral ampliﬁcation within the LPM would be a less
signiﬁcant factor in determining overall zoonotic exposure. In this
case, even the ban on holding live poultry overnight might fail to sub-
stantially reduce human exposure (Fig. 2). In the case of AIV strains
that have lower prevalence within incoming poultry, it is possible that
even the monthly or bimonthly rest days would signiﬁcantly reduce
overall exposure of humans to the zoonotic viruses (Fig. 2).
In addition, the implementation of these interventions is crucial
to their effectiveness [37]. For instance, the effectiveness of the over-
night ban would be greatly compromised, if residual poultry was
simply moved to an “off-site” holding facility and re-introduced
Table 4
Number of human H7N9-cases before and after LPM closure (qualitative studies).
Study Intervention Location Date of
implementation
Data collection period before
and after the intervention
npre npost Source of epidemiological
data
Murhekar et al.
(2013)
Closure of LPMs and sale spots; culling
of all live birds in wLPMs; safe disposal
of culled birds, excreta, feed and water;
C/D of materials, transportation tools
and market environment
Shanghai On April 6th, 2013 Before: February 19th–April
6th
After: April 7th–May 2nd
25 6
last case onset: April
13th, 2013;
Not reported
Zhejiang province (including Hangzhou,
Huzhou and Jiaxing)
Between April
11th and 19th,
2013
Before: March 7th–April 11th
After: April 12th–May 2nd
24 22
last case onset (Zhejiang/
Jiangsu): April 17th,
2013.
Jiangsu province (Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi
and Zhenjiang)
Between April 8th
and 10th , 2013
Before: March 8th–April 8th
After: April 9th–May 1st
21 4
Han et al. (2013) Sequential closure of 139 LPMs Huzhou Between April
11th and April
21st, 2013
Before: March 5th–April 11th
After: April 22st–May 13th
7
during closing
period: 5
0
last case: May 15th
Laboratory-conﬁrmed
H7N9-cases according to
the deﬁnition in the
Chinese MoH guidelines
He et al. (2014) Temporary closure of 464 LPMs, C/D,
ban on poultry import
Shanghai On April 6th, 2013 Before: February 12th–April
6th, 2013
After: April 7th–May 10th,
2013
29
Control
provinces:
34
1st incubation period: 4
2nd incubation period: 0
Control provinces:
1st incubation period: 31
2nd incubation period:
13
Conﬁrmed H7N9-cases;
source not reported
Second LPM closure On January 31st,
2014
Before: early
January–January 31st, 2014
After: February
1st–September 2014
8 0
Xiang et al. (2013) LPM closure Shanghai On April 6th, 2013 Before: 1–7 days before LPM
closure
After: 1–7 or 8–14 days after
LPM closure
11 (14% of all
PUE-cases)
1–7 days after:
4 (2% of all PUE-cases)
8–14 days after:
1 (1% of all PUE-cases)
National PUE surveillance
system
Nanjing On April 8th, 2013 5 (71% of all
PUE-cases)
1–7 days after:
0 (0% of all PUE-cases)
8–14 days after:
1 (100% of all PUE-cases)
Hangzhou on April 15th,
2013
15 (25% of all
PUE-cases)
1–7 days after:
4 (12% of all PUE-cases)
8–14 days after:
0 (0% of all PUE-cases)
Provinces combined 31 (21% of all
PUE-cases)
1–7 days after:
8 (4% of all PUE-cases)
8–14 days after:
2 (2% of all PUE-cases)
npre = number of H7N9-cases during the time period before the intervention.
npost = number of H7N9-cases during the time period after the intervention.
LPM= live poultry market.
wLPM=wholesale live poultry market.
C/D = cleaning and disinfection.
MoH =Ministry of Health.
PUE = pneumonia of unknown etiology
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Fig. 2. Impact of incoming poultry prevalence on the effectiveness of rest days in LPMs. (A) Effectiveness of regular rest days in LPMs in reducing isolation rates of the H9N2 subtype.
Because of the high endemicity of H9N2 in incoming poultry, viral ampliﬁcation within the LPM is a less signiﬁcant factor in determining overall zoonotic exposure. In this scenario,
even frequent depopulation interventions might fail to substantially reduce human exposure. (B) Effectiveness of regular rest days in LPMs in reducing isolation rates of H5N1. If the
AIV-prevalence among incoming birds is relatively low, regular rest days might substantially reduce the risk of human exposure to zoonotic infection.
62 V. Offeddu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 55–64into the market the next day. Considering the poor knowledge about
AIVs [38] and low perceived self-infection risk [39] among LPM
workers, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the motivation to ad-
here to a rigorous implementation of these interventions and to
carry out effective disinfection of the premises may decline overFig. 3. One health approach to eliminate the risk of human and animal inﬂuenza (A) AIVs ma
markets. The ampliﬁcation of AIVs in rLPMs contributes to dissemination of viruses back to w
reducing AIV circulation in LPMs may also reduce the spread of viruses to the upstream poultrtime. To date, the relative contribution of the disinfection of themar-
ket to the observed impact of rest days or overnight bans is not elu-
cidated. Emptying of the facilities may already be sufﬁcient to reduce
residual viral load through thermal inactivation of the virus infectiv-
ity. Additional studies using virus isolation (rather than RT-PCR,y be introduced into retail LPMs (rLPMs) through infected birds from farms or wholesale
holesale LPMs and poultry farms via contaminated cages and trucks. (B) Interventions
y production sector.
63V. Offeddu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 55–64which does not discriminate between live and dead virus) are need-
ed to address these questions.
Finally, it is relevant to note that the ampliﬁcation of avian inﬂuenza
in live poultrymarkets also contributes to dissemination of viruses back
to poultry farms via contaminated cages and trucks (Fig. 3) [8,11]. Evi-
dently, measures to reduce AIV ampliﬁcation in LPMs may reduce the
spread of avian inﬂuenza to both the upstream poultry production sec-
tor and to humans, thus truly exemplifying the implementation of the
“one health” concept.
Although RRRs represent relatively comparable outcome measures
of the intervention effects across publications, these values should be
interpretedwith care. Aside from the very different sampling schedules,
with time windows ranging from b14 days [19,23,27] to year-long sur-
veillance [20,21,26], the studies actually assessed very distinct scenari-
os: the duration and frequency of interventions ranged between one
weekly rest day [26] and a one-time two-week LPM closure [27] in dif-
ferent LPM systems. In addition, sample sizes were very variable [21,26,
27]. Importantly, samples were usually collected from different mar-
kets, distinct market areas and from several bird species, but pre- and
post-intervention data was not unequivocally matched [19–21,23,26,
27]. Moreover, some investigations assessed AIV-prevalence by virus
isolation [19–21,23,27], while others used RT-PCR [26,27]. Positive RT-
PCR results do not discriminate between viable infectious virus and
inactivated virus and thus does not have the same biological implica-
tions as virus isolation does. Finally, some interventions had different
impacts onAIV circulation in different bird species [20,21]. This suggests
distinct AIV-transmission dynamics across species or varying market
practises, highlighting the importance to investigate different species
separately.
4.2. Studies with avian inﬂuenza infections in humans as outcome
The existing literature convincingly points at LPMs as the source of
the majority of conﬁrmed H7N9-cases in China [18,28–35,40]. A signif-
icant deceleration of H7N9-incidence following LPM closurewas consis-
tently detected in all investigations assessed in this review, conﬁrming a
signiﬁcant association of LPM closure with a reduction in bird-to-
human transmission.
In some instances, the prolonged emergence of cases in adjacent
provinces,where LPM tradewas not arrested, served as negative control
[18,29]. Similarly, the ﬂuctuations in H7N9-incidence rates closely fol-
lowing the time course of closing, re-opening and re-closing of themar-
kets in Shanghai [18], supported the reliability of the causal inferences.
However, all included studies remain of ecologic nature and, al-
though one investigation ascertained the geographical and temporal co-
incidence of the reported incidence drops with speciﬁc LPM closure
dates [29], an estimation of area-speciﬁc effectiveness was often not
possible. Thus, most of these studies are prone to confounding and
bias, especially when no causal inferential framework was used [18,
33–35]. For instance, the impact of contemporaneous interventions out-
side LPMs or behavioural changes was never incorporated. Although
some studies accounted for climatic factors, e.g. humidity [29,31], it can-
not be ruled out that unmeasured or unknown seasonal factors
inﬂuencing inﬂuenza virus transmission in birds or humans [41–43]
might have affected the incidence of H7N9.
Moreover, the source of human incidence data was not always re-
ported [18,31–33], although estimates of LPM closure effectiveness
might be strongly dependent on case reporting patterns. The ﬁndings
are to be regarded as valid only if reporting through each speciﬁc data
source had closely tracked the outbreak patterns [28].
5. Conclusions
The risk of zoonotic AIV-transmission from LPMs continues to pose
an important threat to human health [44,45]. Besides the current efforts
of pre-emptive vaccine manufacture [46] and systematic riskassessment [47], efﬁcient pandemic preparedness requires interven-
tions that prevent viral emergence at the source.
The proactive substitution of live poultry trade with a central
slaughtering system would probably reduce the zoonotic risk to a min-
imum, although it should be noted that AIV-contamination of chicken
carcasses may conceivably continue to pose a threat through freshly
slaughtered, chilled poultry. Moreover, such a dramatic intervention
would imply a major re-structuring of the current poultry industry in
many parts of Asia [29,48], the annihilation of a long-standing culture
of live bird trading and the potential ampliﬁcation of illegal poultry traf-
ﬁcking [49]. It is also relevant to note that,while themajority of zoonotic
H7N9-cases have a history of exposure to poultry or LPM, a minority of
them do not [50–52].
Based on the evidence collected in this review, the interplay be-
tween the poultry's length of stay in the markets and the AIV-
incubation period is a crucial control point to curb AIV-circulation in
LPMs. In addition to accompanying precautions, e.g. vaccination of in-
coming poultry, the magnitude of the detected effects advocates for
the prioritization of periodic rest days, overnight storage bans and the
separation of poultry species as highly effective and applicable interven-
tions worldwide.
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